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1	Why	use	neuroimaging	methods	to	study	ongoing	thought?
Cognition	is	not	always	focused	on	the	events	taking	place	in	the	environment,	we	often	spend	large	periods	of	time	immersed	in	thoughts	that	are	generated	intrinsically.	A	common	example	of	such	a	self-generated	experiential	state	is	the	experience	of	mind-
wandering	where,	instead	of	processing	information	from	the	external	environment,	one's	attention	is	directed	toward	internal	thoughts,	feelings	and	personal	reflections	(Seli	et	al.,	2018).	Research	suggests	that	mind-wandering	takes	up	anywhere	from	a	third	to	half	of
our	mental	life	(Kane	et	al.,	2007),	has	an	impact	on	everyday	life	activities	(Cowley,	2013;	McVay	et	al.,	2009)	and	has	been	observed	across	multiple	cultures	(Deng	et	al.,	2012;	Levinson	et	al.,	2012;	Smallwood	et	al.,	2009;	Song	and	Wang,	2012;	Tusche	et	al.,	2014).
By	nature,	therefore,	ongoing	thought	 is	subject	to	a	continuous	evolution	across	time,	and	these	changes	can	often	occur	 in	a	covert	manner	(Smallwood,	2013).	While	techniques	such	as	experience	sampling	(Csikszentmihalyi	and	Larson,	1987)	make	it
possible	to	estimate	participants'	thoughts	and	feelings	as	they	occur,	providing	an	‘online’	measure	of	experience,	this	data	relies	on	subjective	self-reports,	rather	than	objective	measurements.	By	comparison,	although	behavioural	indices	of	ongoing	thought	may	be
less	subjective	because	they	provide	measures	of	the	observable	consequences	associated	with	performing	dull,	monotonous	tasks,	studies	suggest	that	there	is	not	a	one	to	one	mapping	between	slips	of	action	and	patterns	of	off-task	thought	(Konishi	et	al.,	2017).	The
limitations	of	both	subjective	and	behavioural	indices,	therefore,	make	it	a	challenge	to	establish	a	mature	scientific	account	of	ongoing	thought.
This	 review	considers	 the	advantages	 that	 can	be	gained	when	patterns	of	ongoing	 thought	are	examined	using	 the	strategy	of	 triangulation	whereby	self-reports,	behavioural	measures,	and	neurocognitive	measures	are	used	 in	concert	 (Smallwood	and
Schooler,	2015).	We	will	argue	that	neuroimaging	tools	are	important	for	understanding	two	aspects	of	ongoing	thought.	In	particular,	the	tools	of	cognitive	neuroscience	(i)	can	provide	insight	into	whether	experience	is	focused	externally	or	internally	and	(ii)	will	help
determine	the	different	 forms	that	experiences	can	take	with	consideration	of	 the	underlying	mechanisms.	Before	considering	how	neuroimaging	can	be	combined	with	subjective	measures	of	ongoing	thought,	 this	review	will	briefly	consider	 the	different	methods	of
experience	sampling,	with	a	specific	aim	to	consider	their	strengths	and	weaknesses	in	studies	of	neuroimaging	(see	Fig.	1.,	a	flow	chart	describing	the	analytical	decisions	guiding	the	use	of	neuroimaging	technics	in	the	investigation	of	ongoing	thought).
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Abstract
Human	cognition	is	not	limited	to	the	processing	of	events	in	the	external	environment,	and	the	covert	nature	of	certain	aspects	of	the	stream	of	consciousness	(e.g.	experiences	such	as	mind-wandering)	provides	a	methodological	challenge.	Although
research	has	shown	that	we	spend	a	substantial	amount	of	time	focused	on	thoughts	and	feelings	that	are	intrinsically	generated,	evaluating	such	internal	states,	purely	on	psychological	grounds	can	be	restrictive.	In	this	review	of	the	different	methods	used	to
examine	patterns	of	ongoing	thought,	we	emphasise	how	the	process	of	triangulation	between	neuroimaging	techniques,	with	self-reported	information,	is	important	for	the	development	of	a	more	empirically	grounded	account	of	ongoing	thought.	Specifically,
we	show	how	imaging	techniques	have	provided	critical	information	regarding	the	presence	of	covert	states	and	can	help	in	the	attempt	to	identify	different	aspects	of	experience.
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2	Methodology	of	measuring	ongoing	thought
Although	ongoing	thought	is	a	challenge	to	study,	experience	sampling	remains	the	gold	standard	measure	for	identifying	the	explicit	contents	of	consciousness	(Smallwood	and	Schooler,	2015).	There	are	a	number	of	different	methods	of	estimating	patterns	of
ongoing	thought	and	here	we	highlight	the	different	self-report	methods	that	can	be	combined	with	neuroimaging	techniques.
2.1	Self-report	methods
There	are	 three	basic	methods	of	experience	sampling	 that	are	used	 in	studies	of	ongoing	 thought:	online	experience	sampling,	 retrospective	experience	sampling,	and	assessment	of	disposition.	Online	experience	sampling	 involves	gathering	self-reports
regarding	a	participant's	ongoing	experience	‘in	the	moment’	while	they	are	completing	other	activities.	The	probe-caught	method	requires	participants	to	be	intermittently	interrupted,	often	while	performing	a	task,	and	are	asked	to	describe	the	content	of	their	experience
(Smallwood	and	Schooler,	2006).	Within	this	area	of	research	there	are	two	main	methods	of	analysis.	One	gains	open	reports	from	the	participants	which	are	then	coded	based	on	predefined	characteristics,	for	example	whether	they	are	related	to	the	task,	or	aspects	of
their	content	(Baird	et	al.,	2011;	Hulburt	et	al.,	2006;	Smallwood	et	al.,	2003).	Other	approaches	require	that	participants	answer	questions	that	probe	specific	aspects	of	experience	such	as	its	level	of	deliberation	(Seli	et	al.,	2017)	or	 its	 level	of	awareness	(Smallwood	et	al.,
2007b).	A	second	type	of	online	experience	sampling	is	the	self-caught	method	where	participants	are	asked	to	spontaneously	report	their	mind-wandering	episodes	at	the	moments	they	are	noticed	(Smallwood	and	Schooler,	2006).	In	such	paradigms,	participants	are	asked
Fig.	1	Flow	chart	describing	the	analytical	decisions	guiding	the	use	of	neuroimaging	technics	in	the	investigation	of	ongoing	thought.	*	This	question	can	only	be	answered	using	online	measure	of	brain	activity.	Note:	ES = Experience	Sampling,	MDES = Multidimensional	Experience	Sampling.
alt-text:	Fig.	1
to	press	a	button	when	noticing	that	their	mind	has	drifted	away	from	the	task	at	hand.	Both	types	of	online	experience	have	the	advantage	of	being	able	to	determine	the	patterns	of	thought	taking	place	at	a	specific	moment	in	time.
Experience	can	also	be	sampled	at	the	end	of	a	task.	In	this	approach,	self-reported	data	is	gathered	retrospectively	at	the	end	of	a	task	or	a	block	of	trials,	rather	than	in	the	moment.	Smallwood	and	Schooler	(2015)	refer	to	this	as	retrospective	sampling	as	it
involves	 gathering	 estimations	 of	 experiences	 immediately	 after	 the	 task	 has	 been	 completed.	 The	advantage	of	 this	method	 is	 that	 it	 preserves	 the	 natural	 time	 course	 of	 ongoing	 thought,	 as	 participants	 do	 not	 need	 to	 be	 interrupted	 to	 report	 their	 experience.
Retrospective,	end	of	task	estimations	of	mind-wandering	may	be	gathered	via	single	questions	at	the	end	of	a	task,	via	questionnaires	(e.g.	the	Dundee	Stress	State	Questionnaire,	DSSQ;	Matthews	et	al.,	1999),	using	the	New	York	Cognition	Questionnaire	(Gorgolewski	et
al.,	2014;	Wang	et	al.,	2018a,b)	or	through	open-ended	questions.	As	retrospective	measures	do	not	interrupt	the	dynamics	of	cognition,	their	combination	with	online	measures	of	neural	function	provides	a	promising	way	to	understand	the	broader	temporal	dynamics	of
experience,	using	 techniques	 that	exploit	 temporal	changes	 in	neural	signals	such	as	 functional	connectivity	 (Biswal	et	al.,	1996),	hidden	Markov	modelling	(Vidaurre	et	al.,	2017)	or	sliding	window	analysis	 (Kucyi	et	al.,	2017).	However,	a	weakness	of	 the	 retrospective
approach	is	that	this	method	relies	on	memory,	making	it	impossible	to	relate	self-reported	data	to	a	specific	moment	in	time.	Table	1	presents	a	summary	of	the	different	questionnaires	that	are	available	for	use	in	both	the	online	and	retrospective	domains.
Table	1	Most	useful	questionnaires	to	use	in	association	with	resting	state	fMRI	scan,	with	a	description	of	their	purpose	and	aimed	population.
alt-text:	Table	1
Questionnaire Description Purpose Population Examples
Retrospective	measures
New	York	Cognition
Questionnaire
(Gorgolewski	et	al.,
2014)
31-items	and	2	subscales,	the	first	containing	questions	about	the	content	of	thoughts	(past,
future,	positive,	negative,	and	social	experiences),	the	second	containing	questions	about	the
form	that	these	thoughts	take	(words,	images,	and	thought	specificity).
Assess	thoughts	and	feelings	experienced
during	the	performance	of	a	particular	task
and	at	rest.
Any	age	in	adulthood.
Patients	(e.g.	generalised	anxiety
disorder)	and	healthy	participants.
(Makovac	et	al.,	2018;	Sanders	et	al.,
2017;	Wang	et	al.,	2018a,b)
Amsterdam	Resting
state	questionnaire
(Diaz	et	al.,	2013)
50-items	from	which	5	factors	can	be	extracted:	Discontinuity	of	Mind,	Theory	of	Mind,	Self,
Planning,	Sleepiness,	Comfort,	and	Somatic	Awareness
Assess	thoughts	and	feelings	experienced
during	rest.	Sensitive	to	brain	disorder.
Patients	(e.g.	obsessive-compulsive
personality	disorder)	and	healthy
participants	of	any	age	in
adulthood.
(Coutinho	et	al.,	2016;	Diaz	et	al.,
2014;	Stoffers	et	al.,	2015)
Resting	state
questionnaire
(Delamillieure	et	al.,
2010)
Semi-structured	questionnaire	of	62-items	composing	5	types	of	mental	activity:	visual	mental
imagery,	inner	language	(split	into	two	subtypes:	inner	speech	and	auditory	mental	imagery),
somatosensory	awareness,	inner	musical	experience,	and	mental	manipulation	of	numbers.
Assess	thoughts	and	feelings	experienced
during	rest.
Healthy	participants	of	any	age	in
adulthood.
(Chou	et	al.,	2017;	Doucet	et	al.,
2012;	Hurlburt	et	al.,	2015;	Paban	et
al.,	2018)
Probe	and	self-caught	measures
Multi-Dimensional
Experience	Sampling
(e.g.	Ruby	et	al.,
2013a)
Multiple	questions	used	in	a	probe	caught	context.	The	first	question	is	referencing	to	task	focus
and	the	following	12	are	targeting	characteristics	such	as	future,	past,	self,	and	detailed	features
of	the	experience.
Captures	simultaneously	different	aspects	of
experience	allowing	their	heterogeneity	to	be
empirically	evaluated	in	an	online	context.
Any	age	in	adulthood.
Patients	and	healthy	participants.
(Golchert	et	al.,	2017;	Konishi	et	al.,
2017;	Medea	et	al.,	2016;	Smallwood
et	al.,	2016;	Turnbull	et	al.,	2019)
Shape	Expectations
Task	(O'Callaghan	et
al.,	2015)
Task	with	minimal	external	stimulation	and	without	constraints	to	perform	on	a	cognitive	task.
Can	be	implemented	by	thought	probes	with	free	report	of	thought	content.	A	scoring	system	is
then	used	to	evaluate	thought	frequency	and	content.
Investigate	the	frequency	and	content	of
mind	wandering	in	the	context	of	low
cognitive	demands.
Healthy	participants	of	any	age	in
adulthood.
Particularly	relevant	for	populations
with	reduced	cognitive	resources
(e.g.	older	adults,	dementia
patients).
(Geffen	et	al.,	2017;	Irish,	Goldberg,
Alaeddin,	O'Callaghan	and	Andrews-
Hanna,	2018;	O'Callaghan	et	al.,
2017)
As	originally	suggested	by	Eric	Klinger	(Klinger	and	Cox,	1987)	and	Jerome	Singer	(for	a	review	see	McMillan	et	al.,	2013;	Singer,	1975),	an	emerging	body	of	evidence	has	found	that	ongoing	experience	is	heterogeneous	with	multiple	distinct	types	of	experience
that	may	each	have	unique	cognitive	profiles	(Smallwood	and	Andrews-Hanna,	2013).	In	this	context,	it	has	become	important	to	assess	multiple	dimensions	of	experience	at	the	same	time	(Golchert	et	al.,	2017;	Karapanagiotidis	et	al.,	2017;	Konishi	et	al.,	2017;	Medea	et	al.,	2016;
Ruby	et	al.,	2013a,b;	Smallwood	et	al.,	2016;	Wang	et	al.,	2018a,b).	This	approach	is	often	described	as	Multi-Dimensional	Experience	Sampling	(MDES;	Shrimpton	et	al.,	2017;	Smallwood	et	al.,	2016)	and	allows	the	experimenter	to	simultaneously	capture	different	aspects	of
experience	allowing	their	heterogeneity	to	be	empirically	evaluated.	Neuroimaging	methods	are	particularly	important	in	this	regard	because	it	remains	unclear	whether	different	types	of	experience	can	share	underlying	neural	features	(as	would	be	expected	if	common
cognitive	processes	are	important	in	multiple	different	types	of	experience).	In	this	contextTherefore,	neuroimaging	techniques	are	important	because	they	raise	the	possibility	of	objectively	identifying	whether	similar	neural	regions	are	involved	in	different	states	(e.g.	through
the	analysis	of	spatial	conjunction).	For	example,	Smallwood	et	al.	(2016)	found	that	multiple	different	aspects	of	experience	-	thoughts	related	to	different	temporal	periods,	off-task	thoughts,	and	thoughts	with	vivid	detail	were	associated	with	stronger	connectivity	at	rest
between	regions	of	the	temporal	lobe	and	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex.	This	observation	has	important	consequences	for	neurocognitive	accounts	of	different	types	of	experience	emerge	because	they	illustrate	that	multiple	types	of	experience	may	depend	on	similar
brain	regions.
It	 is	also	possible	 to	measure	dispositional	differences	 in	patterns	of	ongoing	 thought	using	questionnaires	 that	map	 traits	 linked	 to	different	 types	of	experience.	For	example,	 the	 Imaginal	Processes	 Inventory	 (IPI;	Huba	et	al.,	1982),	 the	Mind-Wandering
Questionnaire	(MWQ;	Mrazek	et	al.,	2013),	and	the	Mind-Wandering	Deliberate	and	Spontaneous	scale	(Carriere	et	al.,	2013;	Seli	et	al.,	2015a)	are	all	individual	difference	measures	which	ask	participants	to	assess	the	characteristics	of	their	daydreams	or	mind-wandering
experiences	in	the	context	of	their	daily	functioning.	Similar	to	end	of	task	estimation	measures,	this	method	relies	on	retrospective	judgements	concerning	previous	mind-wandering	experiences	rather	than	online	reporting.	However,	when	these	measures	are	used,
participants	have	to	think	back	over	a	longer	period	of	time	when	reporting	their	experience	and	this	presents	greater	risk	of	biases	in	reporting.
These	different	types	of	experience	sampling	enable	researchers	to	investigate	the	role	of	individual	differences	on	laboratory-based	mind-wandering	tasks	and	gather	information	regarding	general	patterns	of	ongoing	thought	in	the	real	world,	making	them	more
ecologically	valid.	Interestingly,	different	characteristics	can	be	found	between	experience	sampling	in	the	laboratory	and	in	daily-life	(Kane	et	al.,	2017).	While	each	approach	has	weaknesses,	in	combination,	they	offer	the	potential	to	refine	our	understanding	of	the	nature
of	ongoing	thought.	For	example,	measures	of	typical	mind-wandering	styles	have	been	successfully	associated	with	experience	sampling,	giving	insight	about	the	association	between	temporal	focus	and	self-related	thoughts	(Shrimpton	et	al.,	2017),	and	the	verification	of
differences	in	spontaneous	and	deliberate	mind-wandering	both	through	associations	with	ADHD	(Seli	et	al.,	2015b)	and	in	the	brain	(Golchert	et	al.,	2017).
2.2	Behavioural	Methods
Building	on	evidence	that	certain	forms	of	experience	are	linked	to	measures	of	performance	on	a	task,	research	has	also	focused	on	the	possibility	that	behavioural	markers	could	provide	additional	 insight	 into	the	processes	underlying	different	aspects	of
experience.	Often	this	involves	examining	performance	on	tasks	that	encourage	the	onset	of	mind	wandering	in	the	first	placeOften	this	involves	examining	performance	on	tasks	that	encourage	the	onset	of	particular	types	of	experience	(e.g.	mind	wandering)	in	the	first	place	because	they	are
simple	and	non-demanding	and	one	 in	which	the	occurrence	of	 the	experience	 is	 likely	 to	have	a	consequence	for	performance.	Examining	the	consequence	of	a	particular	covert	state	 in	 this	manner	has	a	 long	history	 in	psychology	where	direct	measurement	 is	not
possible.	For	instance,	when	examining	the	cost	of	dual	tasking	on	everyday	memory,	measures	are	not	only	made	on	the	secondary	task	but	also	on	the	primary	task	(Huang	and	Mercer,	2001).	Here,	one	can	consider	the	ongoing	activity	of	self-generated	thoughts	as	a
primary	task,	which	will	impact	one's	performance	on	the	secondary	task.	As	such,	by	measuring	the	secondary	task,	one	gains	information	about	the	primary	task,	namely	the	self-generation	of	thoughts	(Teasdale	et	al.,	1995;	Teasdale	et	al.,	1993).	One	of	the	first	examples
of	this	procedure	was	a	study	by	Teasdale	et	al.	(1993)	who	showed	that	during	a	task	of	random	number	generation,	the	occurrence	of	off-task	thoughts	were	linked	to	periods	when	the	participant	had	begun	to	generate	more	predictable	series	of	digits	(Teasdale	et	al.,
1995).	Episodes	of	poorer	performance	on	this	secondary	task,	for	example	in	terms	of	accuracy,	false	alarms,	or	reaction	time	variability	are	assumed	to	signal	the	occurrence	of	patterns	of	ongoing	thought	that	are	not	related	to	efficient	performance	of	the	task.	This
technique	has	been	applied	to	a	wide	range	of	different	task	paradigms	and	demonstrated	that	periods	of	off-task	thought	are	linked	to	worse	performance	on	tasks	measuring	encoding	(Smallwood	et	al.,	2003),	reading	(Smallwood	et	al.,	2008),	working	memory	(Kane	et	al.,
2007),	and	intelligence	(Mrazek	et	al.,	2012).
A	task	that	has	frequently	been	used	to	both	encourage	and	measure	mind-wandering	is	the	Sustained	Attention	Response	Task	(SART;	Robertson	et	al.,	1997).	This	requires	participants	to	respond	as	quickly	as	possible	to	frequent	and	relevant	stimuli	(e.g.,
‘press	the	space	bar	when	the	letter	X	appears’)	whilst	inhibiting	their	responses	to	infrequent	stimuli	(e.g.	‘do	nothing	when	the	letter	Y	appears’).	One	advantage	of	this	method	is	that	researchers	may	use	it	to	manipulate	the	prevalence	of	mind	wandering	by	varying	the
demands	of	the	task.	For	example,	in	an	investigation	into	the	effect	of	glucose	on	mind-wandering,	Birnie	et	al.	(2015)	found	that	probed	self-reports	of	mind-wandering	were	associated	with	false	alarms	on	the	SART	(i.e.,	erroneously	pressing	the	response	key	to	the
infrequent	stimuli).	Furthermore,	 this	association	was	stronger	on	easier	 trials	of	 the	SART,	supporting	the	 inference	that	mind-wandering	 is	more	prevalent	when	the	demands	of	 the	ongoing	tasks	are	 low.	The	use	of	 the	SART	in	the	 literature	 is	extensive	and	has
uncovered	important	mind-wandering	consequences	such	as	increased	reaction	times	before	errors	and	decreased	reaction	time	after	errors,	which	is	particularly	true	in	ageing	(Jackson	and	Balota,	2012).	Additionally,	a	variation	of	the	original	task	extended	the	findings	to
the	auditory	modality	(Seli	et	al.,	2012).	Notably,	Seli	et	al.	(2013)	developed	the	metronome	task,	which	involves	responding	synchronously	(via	button	presses)	with	a	continuous	rhythmic	presentation	of	tones,	and	demonstrated	behavioural	variability	in	the	responses	as	a
marker	of	mind	wandering.
Although	sustained	attentional	tasks	such	as	the	SART	have	been	used	extensively	in	the	mind	wandering	literature,	it	has	received	recent	criticism	regarding	its	precision	in	measuring	both	sustained	attention	and	the	likelihood	of	mind	wandering	(Dillard	et	al.,
2014).	Problematically	the	SART	does	not	include	any	control	condition	or	baseline,	therefore	preventing	researchers	from	a	clear	interpretation	of	the	variation	in	mind-wandering	rates	(see	the	paradigm	from	Konishi	et	al.,	2015).	In	view	of	this,	a	variant	of	the	cognitive
task	used	by	Konishi	et	al.	(2015)	is	increasingly	being	used	to	both	encourage	and	measure	mind	wandering.	In	this	n-back	paradigm,	participants	alternate	between	blocks	of	trials	in	which	they	either	make	decisions	about	the	location	of	shapes,	which	are	currently
available	to	the	senses	(0-back)	or	with	respect	to	their	location	on	a	prior	trial	(1-back).	Unlike	the	SART,	the	n-back	task	makes	it	possible	to	manipulate	the	demands	of	the	task,	with	an	increase	in	working	memory	load	during	the	1-back	trials,	which	leads	to	a	greater
focus	on	task-relevant	information.	This	task	has	been	useful	in	understanding	how	the	occurrence	of	off-task	thought	in	the	easier	0-back	but	not	the	1-back	task,	is	related	to	an	increased	capacity	to	delay	gratification	(Bernhardt	et	al.,	2014;	Smallwood	et	al.,	2013b).	More
recently	it	has	been	used	to	document	patterns	of	neural	activity	that	support	a	range	of	different	experiential	states	(e.g.	Sormaz	et	al.,	2018).
One	specific	area	where	the	tools	of	neuroimaging	could	be	valuable	in	moving	forward	our	understanding	of	patterns	of	ongoing	thought	is	by	helping	to	identify	the	neural	processes	that	are	common	to	both	errors	in	performance,	and	to	patterns	of	off-task
thinking.	Studies	have	shown	for	example	that	both	reading	comprehension	and	the	frequency	of	off-task	thought	are	related	to	systematic	variations	in	the	connectivity	of	the	Default	Mode	Network	(Smallwood	et	al.,	2013a).	Such	findings,	provide	a	potential	explanation	for
why	off-task	thought	can	interfere	with	our	ability	to	read	for	comprehension	(Smallwood	et	al.,	2008).	On	the	other	hand,	studies	that	have	simultaneously	assessed	both	performance	and	experience	while	neural	activity	has	been	recorded	have	revealed	dissociations
between	the	neural	activity	associated	with	patterns	of	off-task	thinking	form	those	linked	to	behaviour	(Kucyi	et	al.,	2016).	Moving	forward,	the	tools	of	neuroimaging	may	be	helpful	in	assessing	the	underlying	processes	that	help	reveal	the	processes	that	describe	the
association	between	patterns	in	off-task	thinking	and	performance,	and	this	in	turn	will	inform	our	understanding	of	why	off-task	thoughts	can	interfere	with	performance.
2.3	Interim	summary
Both	subjective	and	behavioural	indicators	of	experience	provide	formal	evidence	of	the	nature	of	ongoing	thought	either	at	a	specific	moment	of	time	or	in	a	particular	task	or	condition.	However,	these	measures	offer	only	a	superficial	description	of	the	nature	of
experience,	and	in	particular,	in	isolation,	these	measures	will	struggle	to	provide	evidence	on	underlying	causal	mechanisms.	Recent	work	has	begun	to	overcome	this	limitation	by	combining	self-reported	data	with	measures	of	neuroimaging,	an	approach	that	has	been
useful	in	two	different	domains:	i)	the	quantifying	periods	of	internal	focus	and	ii)	the	understanding	of	the	heterogeneous	nature	of	ongoing	experience	(see	Fig.	1).
3	Quantifying	internal	focus
One	area	in	which	neuroimaging	has	helped	move	forward	studies	of	ongoing	thought	is	through	the	quantification	of	periods	when	the	focus	of	ongoing	thought	shifts	from	the	processing	of	external	sensory	input,	known	as	perceptual	decoupling	(Schooler	et
al.,	2011;	Smallwood,	2013).	These	studies	have	largely	used	Event-Related	Potentials	(ERPs)	generated	from	the	Electroencephalogram	(EEG).	ERP	has	proven	to	be	a	particularly	valuable	tool	for	evaluating	the	level	of	perceptual	engagement	during	different	types	of
ongoing	thought.	Sensory	information	is	processed	relatively	fast,	within	150–200 ms,	and	described	by	evoked	components	known	as	the	P1	and	N1.	While	N1	has	been	found	to	be	sensitive	to	auditory	stimuli	type	and	presentation	predictability,	P1	may	reflect	the	“cost
of	attention”	(Luck	et	al.,	1990).	Elsewhere,	P1	and	N1	have	been	used	to	indicate,	respectively,	the	attentional	filtering	and	categorization	of	perceptual	 information	before	integrating	semantic	knowledge	(Klimesch,	2011,	2012),	and	the	operation	of	a	discrimination
process	when	judgements	about	the	stimuli	are	needed	(Vogel	and	Luck,	2000).	Interestingly,	these	components	are	found	to	be	attenuated	following	reports	of	task-unrelated-thought	(Baird	et	al.,	2014;	Kam	et	al.,	2010).	The	reduction	of	the	amplitude	of	ERPs	that	are
linked	to	early	sensory	processing	is	suggestive	of	a	reduction	of	brain-evoked	response	to	sensory	input	(Baird	et	al.,	2014).	In	particular,	data	such	as	these	suggest	that	the	processing	of	relatively	basic	perceptual	input	information	is	reduced	during	certain	types	of
internal	focus.
The	study	of	a	later	component,	the	P3	(occurrence	between	250	and	500 ms	post-stimulus),	is	assumed	to	reflect	the	engagement	of	attentional	processes	and	studies	have	shown	that	this	is	linked	to	a	reduction	in	amplitude	during	periods	of	off-task	thought
compared	to	being	task	focused	(Barron	et	al.,	2011;	Kam	et	al.,	2012,	2010;	Kam	and	Handy,	2013;	Smallwood	et	al.,	2007a).	Given	the	well-documented	role	of	the	P3	in	attentional	processes,	these	data	suggest	that	periods	of	off-task	thought	are	linked	to	changes	in
attentionally	mediated	task	sets.	However,	studies	have	shown	that	this	process	reflects	a	switch	away	from	the	task	goals,	rather	than	a	failure	to	inhibit	irrelevant	information.	Barron	et	al.	(2011)	used	a	3-stimulus	oddball	paradigm	to	understand	whether	off-task	thought
was	linked	to	lower	processing	of	task	events	regardless	of	their	relevance	to	the	goal,	or	whether	the	attenuation	was	specific	to	task-relevant	information.	The	3-stimulus	oddball	task	typically	comprises	the	presentation	of	task-relevant	infrequent	targets	(requiring	a
response)	in	a	train	of	frequent	stimuli	that	generates	an	ERP	component	called	the	P3b,	while	additional	rare	task-irrelevant	stimuli	are	presented	which	generates	a	component	known	as	the	P3a.	Barron	and	colleagues	demonstrated	a	reduction	of	both	the	P3a	and
P3b,	linked	to	off-task	reports	suggesting	that	the	processing	of	all	stimuli	in	the	environment	is	reduced,	rather	than	just	those	that	are	important	to	the	task.
Alternative	ways	to	quantify	external	focus	have	been	provided	by	analysis	of	more	dynamic	aspects	of	the	EEG	signal.	Braboszcz	and	Delorme	(2011)	demonstrated	increased	activity	of	lower	frequencies	such	as	theta	(4–7 Hz)	and	delta	(2–3.5 Hz),	and	a
decrease	of	higher	frequencies,	namely	alpha	(9–11 Hz)	and	beta	(15–30 Hz),	during	periods	of	mind-wandering	as	compared	to	breath	focus	(mindful	condition).	Delta	power	has	been	associated	with	poor	cognitive	ability	(Harmony,	2013)	and	also	linked	to	lower	state	of
vigilances	(Roth,	1961).	These	authors	suggest	that	their	findings	highlight	a	reduction	of	alertness	to	the	task	during	mind-wandering	experiences.	In	a	similar	vein,	Baird	et	al.	(2014)	observed	reductions	in	spectral	power	during	mind-wandering	compared	with	task	focus
over	 frontal	 regions	 in	 the	alpha	and	beta	band.	Enhanced	alpha	activity	 is	mostly	 found	during	wakeful	 relaxation,	 and	 reflects	 inhibition	of	 task-irrelevant	 cortical	 areas	 (Klimesch	et	 al.,	 2007).	 In	 contrast,	 beta	band	activity	 is	 related	 to	 active	 concentration	and
maintenance	of	current	cognitive	states	(Engel	and	Fries,	2010),	together	enabling	the	efficient	treatment	of	external	input	(For	frequency	bands	functional	significance,	see	Britton	et	al.,	2016).	Braboszcz	and	Delorme	(2011)	outlined	an	additional	layer	of	analyses	by
considering	the	impact	of	meta-cognitive	processes.	The	moment	where	participants	consciously	realise	their	mind	has	been	wandering	is	central	as	it	allows	the	redirection	of	attention	toward	the	task.	Findings	revealed	that	this	process	of	refocus	was	related	to	an
increase	of	the	alpha	peak	frequency	and	a	long-lasting	increase	in	alpha	power.	Considering	that	peaks	of	alpha	frequency	are	thought	to	represent	a	state	of	“cognitive	preparedness”	(Angelakis	et	al.,	2004),	and	that	alpha	power	has	been	linked	to	working	memory
(Jensen	et	al.,	2002),	the	authors	suggest	that	together	the	peak	of	alpha	and	its	general	increase	in	power	may	be	markers	of	attention	shifts	from	an	internal	focus	on	self-generated	information,	to	external	information	relevant	to	the	external	task.
Together,	these	EEG	and	ERP	findings	provide	a	useful	way	to	quantify	whether	experience	is	internally	or	externally	focused.	Off-task	thought	is	linked	to	reductions	in	the	cortical	processing	of	the	environment	at	a	very	early	stage	and	both	task-relevant	and
unrelated	sensory	information	are	processed	in	less	detail.	Additionally,	the	processing	of	an	external	input	is	less	stable	and	this	is	accompanied	by	a	decrease	in	the	neural	efficiency	of	task-related	actions.	Collectively,	this	suggests	that	when	people	are	off-task	their
cortex	is	responding	less	to	environmental	input,	a	pattern	that	is	described	as	perceptual	decoupling	(Smallwood,	2013).	Although	the	relationship	between	evoked	responses	and	patterns	of	experience	are	relatively	well	understood,	the	association	between	patterns	of
oscillatory	activity	and	experience	is	less	well	understood.	In	Box	1	we	present	a	set	of	possible	hypotheses	regarding	potential	relationships	between	different	patterns	of	oscillatory	activity	and	different	aspects	of	experience.
Box	1	Suggestions	for	future	work	using	frequency	bands.
alt-text:	Box	1
Frequency	bands	in	EEG	and	MEG	have	been	related	to	specific	cognitive	processes.	They	also	vary	across	the	sleep	–	wake	continuum,	with	lower	frequencies	related	to	sleep	or	sleep	like	states	and	the	higher	frequency
bands	associated	with	high	concentration	and	focus.	Limited	research	has	considered	frequency	bands	in	relation	to	mind-wandering	experiences,	particularly	with	regard	to	different	types	of	experience.	Here	we	suggest	a	number	of
hypotheses	for	future	research	investigating	the	relationship	between	self-generated	thoughts	and	oscillations	in	neural	activity.
The	contribution	of	the	theta	band	(4–7 Hz)	has	been	evidenced	during	tasks	involving	working	memory	and	episodic	memory	encoding	and	retrieval	(Klimesch,	1999;	Mitchell	et	al.,	2008;	Sauseng	et	al.,	2005).	Particularly,	 this
frequency	band	has	been	linked	on	multiple	occasion	to	activity	in	the	hippocampus	(for	a	review	see	Buzsáki,	2002).	Since	studies	suggest	that	memory	processes	are	important	 in	self-generated	thought	(e.g.	Poerio	et	al.,	2017)	 it	 is
possible	that	theta	activity	could	reflect	the	role	of	memory	representations	in	periods	of	self-generated	thought.
The	alpha	band	(8–12 Hz)	is	considered	the	dominant	frequency	band	in	adults	and	a	striking	increase	in	activity	can	be	seen	upon	eyes	closing.	Enhanced	alpha	frequency	band	oscillation	is	suggested	to	reflect	inhibition	of
task-irrelevant	cortical	areas	(Klimesch	et	al.,	2007).	It	is	possible	that	high	levels	of	alpha	activity	could	reflect	the	process	of	perceptual	decoupling	that	is	thought	to	be	important	in	internal	states.
Lastly,	higher	 frequency	bands	are	good	 indicators	of	 task-relevant	 treatment	of	 information.	Beta	 (13–29 Hz)	activity,	 for	example,	 is	an	 indicator	of	 concentration	and	 is	associated	with	 focus	and	alertness,	enabling	 the
maintenance	of	a	status	quo	(Engel	and	Fries,	2010).	Less	 is	known	about	 the	 functionality	of	 the	gamma	band	(>30 Hz),	yet,	 research	seems	 to	highlight	 its	 implication	 in	higher	order	processing	and	 the	binding	of	higher	cognitive
functions	(Başar-Eroglu	et	al.,	1996).	It	is	thus	possible	that	gamma	activity	may	help	bind	together	patterns	of	self-generated	thought.
4	Quantifying	the	processes	underlying	different	types	of	experience
A	second	area	in	which	neuroimaging	research	has	the	potential	to	propel	our	understanding	of	ongoing	thought	is	through	the	ability	to	determine	differences	in	types	of	ongoing	thought,	and	these	studies	have	often	used	fMRI.	Contemporary	accounts	argue
that	the	content	of	ongoing	thought	is	heterogeneous	in	terms	of	both	its	content,	and	its	relationship	to	functional	outcomes	(Smallwood	and	Andrews-Hanna,	2013).	For	example,	there	is	a	wide	range	of	things	that	people	think	about	when	their	mind	wanders,	reflecting
variables	such	as	temporal	focus,	affective	state,	and	interest	(Smallwood	and	Schooler,	2015).	For	exampleinstance,	mind-wandering	can	sometimes	focus	on	past	or	future	events	(Baird	et	al.,	2011),	may	involve	thoughts	relevant	to	one's	self	or	others	(Baird	et	al.,
2011;	Ruby	et	al.,	2013a,b),	it	may	be	positive	or	negative	in	valence	(Poerio	et	al.,	2013),	and	can	either	be	intentional	or	unintentional	in	origin	(Seli	et	al.,	2016b).	This	wide	variety	of	different	patterns	of	thought	requires	the	assessment	of	multiple	experiential	factors.	In
addition,	evidence	suggests	that	patterns	of	ongoing	thought	are	also	variable	in	terms	of	the	associated	functional	outcomes.	For	example,	while	some	studies	have	shown	that	periods	of	mind-wandering	occurrence	has	a	negative	impact	on	mood	(Killingsworth	and
Gilbert,	2010)	and	cognitive	task	performance,	such	as	sustained	attention,	working	memory	capacity,	and	reading	comprehension	(Mrazek	et	al.,	2012;	Smallwood	et	al.,	2008),	others	have	revealed	the	positive	effects	of	task	unrelated	thought,	for	example,	enabling
future	planning	(Baird	et	al.,	2011;	Medea	et	al.,	2016),	creativity	(Baird	et	al.,	2012),	social	problem	solving	(Ruby	et	al.,	2013a),	and	fostering	a	more	patient	style	of	making	decisions	(Smallwood	et	al.,	2013a,b).
As	shown	above,	there	are	multiple	patterns	of	experience	that	participants	report	in	the	off-task	state,	however,	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	these	should	be	considered	unique	categories	of	experience	or	not.	In	this	context,	neuroimaging	can	help	address
this	uncertainty	since	it	could	help	determine	whether	different	patterns	of	experience	may	depend	on	similar	or	different	neural	processes.	In	this	way,	combining	self-reported	information	with	modern	neuroimaging	techniques	would	provide	a	layer	of	objective	data	that
can	 inform	our	understanding	of	 the	best	way	 to	 categorise	subjective	states.	For	example,	neuroimaging	 techniques	provide	covert	measures	of	underlying	cognitive	processing,	 thus	helping	 to	determine	whether	 variable	mind-wandering	 frequency,	 content,	 and
outcomes	are	associated	with	parallel	physical	differences	 in	 the	brain.	Moreover,	advances	 in	machine	 learning	offer	 the	potential	 to	 infer	 the	heterogeneity	of	different	experiential	states	directly	 from	 the	combined	decompositions	of	neural	and	self-reported	data
(Vatansever	et	al.,	2017;	Wang	et	al.,	2018a,b).	In	one	of	these	studies,	Wang	and	colleagues	used	canonical	correlation	analysis	to	perform	a	conjoined	decomposition	of	the	reports	that	participants	made	at	the	end	of	a	scanning	session	with	the	functional	connectivity
of	the	whole	brain	at	rest.	This	 identified	a	pattern	of	 individual	variation	that	correlated	with	both	thoughts	related	to	an	individuals’	current	concerns	as	well	as	reduced	connectivity	within	task-positive	systems	important	for	external	attention	and	was	linked	to	poor
performance	on	measures	of	intelligence	and	control	(Wang	et	al.,	2018a,b).	Interestingly	these	networks	included	both	the	ventral	and	dorsal	attention	networks,	which	are	both	thought	to	be	important	in	the	generation	of	stronger	evoked	response	linked	to	attention	(e.g.
the	P3).
A	large	proportion	of	previous	fMRI	research	has	focussed	on	the	default	mode	network	(DMN)	which	tends	to	show	a	pattern	of	deactivation	in	externally	demanding	tasks	that	depend	upon	the	efficient	processing	of	external	information	(for	review	see	Raichle,
2015).	While	initial	views	of	this	network	emphasised	a	role	that	was	opposed	to	tasks	(i.e.	Fox	et	al.,	2005),	it	is	now	recognised	that	this	view	is	too	simplistic.	While	the	DMN	is	active	during	off-task	thought	(Allen	et	al.,	2013;	Christoff	et	al.,	2009;	Hasenkamp	et	al.,
2012;	Stawarczyk,	Majerus,	Maj,	Van	der	Linden,	&	D'Argembeau,	2011),	it	is	also	active	in	many	other	situations	involving	autobiographical	memory,	semantic	processing,	planning	of	the	personal	future,	imagination,	theory	of	mind,	and	self-reflection	(Andrews-Hanna,
2012;	Spreng	and	Grady,	2009;	Spreng	et	al.,	2008;	for	a	review	of	DMN	functions	see	Andrews-Hanna,	Smallwood	and	Spreng,	2014;	Buckner	et	al.,	2008).	More	recently,	Sormaz	and	colleagues	used	experience	sampling	to	show	that	the	DMN	plays	an	important	role
in	the	level	of	detail	in	representations	of	task-relevant	information	in	working	memory	(Sormaz	et	al.,	2018).	Together	these	studies	show	that	a	simple	account	mapping	the	DMN	to	the	off-task	state	is	unwarranted	because	it	is	likely	to	be	important	for	task	relevant
states	as	well.
Another	way	to	understand	neural	processes	linked	to	different	patterns	of	ongoing	thought,	is	through	a	specific	comparison	to	brain	activity	of	experiences	that	are	produced	spontaneously	with	those	that	are	part	of	a	task	(Smallwood	and	Schooler,	2015).	One
assumption	of	contemporary	component	process	accounts	of	the	mind-wandering	state	is	that	the	experience	engages	systems	that	can	also	be	engaged	as	part	of	an	external	task.	A	recent	study	by	Tusche	et	al.	(2014)	supports	this	assumption.	They	used	multivariate
pattern	analysis	 (MVPA)	 to	 identify	 similarities	between	spontaneous	and	 task-related	examples	of	positive	and	negative	 thoughts.	They	 found	similar	patterns	of	activation	 (i.e.	medial	 orbitofrontal	 cortex;	mOFC)	 for	both	 the	 task-generated	and	 task-free	affective
experiences,	which	suggests	commonalities	 in	 the	nature	of	 thoughts	 regardless	of	 the	way	 they	have	been	 initiated.	Ultimately,	 the	use	of	MVPA	enables	 researchers	 to	draw	parallels	between	 task-induced	and	naturally	occurring	affective	experiences	and	 to	 test
important	features	of	contemporary	accounts	of	how	patterns	of	ongoing	thought	emerge.	Another	area	in	which	we	might	expect	to	find	overlap	between	the	neural	processes	engaged	during	ongoing	thought	and	those	engaged	in	tasks	may	be	in	the	domain	of	creativity.
There	is	a	robust	correlation	between	variation	in	types	of	off-task	thought	and	more	creative	solutions	to	problems	(Baird	et	al.,	2012;	Smeekens	and	Kane,	2016;	Wang	et	al.,	2018a,b).	More	generally,	a	key	finding	from	the	Christoff	et	al.	(2009)	study	was	the	co-
activation	of	both	the	default	and	executive	networks.	In	general,	the	executive	and	default	networks	are	thought	to	act	in	opposition	to	each	other	so	that	when	the	executive	network	becomes	activated,	the	default	network	is	deactivated	or	actively	suppressed	(Weissman
et	al.,	2006).	However,	there	are	psychological	phenomena	including	creativity,	where	co-activation	of	these	systems	has	been	observed.	For	example,	co-activation	of	those	networks	occurs	during	creative	thinking	(Beaty	et	al.,	2015;	Beaty	et	al.,	2018;	Kounios	et	al.,
2008,	2006),	autobiographical	planning	(Spreng	et	al.,	2010),	during	naturalistic	film	viewing	(Golland	et	al.,	2007)	which	is	related	to	immersive	simulative	mental	experiences	(Mar	and	Oatley,	2008),	and	periods	of	decision	making	when	information	from	memory	can
guide	decision	making	(Konishi	et	al.,	2015;	Murphy	et	al.,	2017).	What	is	common	about	these	examples	is	the	requirement	that	goal	relevant	cognition	must	rely	on	information	from	memory,	and	it	may	be	important	in	the	future	to	understand	the	overlap	between	neural
activity	reflecting	retrieval	of	information	from	memory	with	patterns	observed	during	periods	of	ongoing	thought,	especially	given	evidence	that	more	efficient	memory	processes	are	associated	with	the	off-task	state	(Poerio	et	al.,	2017).
5	Individual	variation
A	final	area	in	which	neuroimaging	has	advanced	our	understanding	of	ongoing	thought	 is	 in	the	area	of	 individual	differences.	These	approaches	depend	on	connectivity	analyses	that	estimate	the	connections	between	different	brain	regions	which	can	be
derived	from	both	the	functional	(i.e.	the	BOLD	signal)	and	the	structural	domain	(i.e.	white	matter	connections,	for	a	comprehensive	review,	see	Rubinov	and	Sporns,	2010).	These	studies	are	useful	 in	understanding	the	neural	basis	of	different	patterns	of	ongoing
thought	since	they	allow	patterns	of	population	variation	in	different	aspects	of	ongoing	thought	to	be	embedded	in	the	functional	organisation	of	the	cortex.	Importantly,	these	studies	use	descriptions	of	the	brain	at	rest	to	describe	each	individual's	neural	architecture,	and
so	only	require	5–15 min	of	brain	activity	to	be	recorded.	While	these	studies	cannot	reveal	the	neural	descriptions	of	the	momentary	changes	that	occur	as	the	mind	wanders,	they	do	provide	a	cost-effective	way	to	generate	individual	differences	in	spontaneous	thought
that	have	sufficient	sample	sizes	to	be	generalizable	to	the	underlying	population,	an	issue	that	is	increasingly	important	for	both	psychology	and	neuroscience	(Yarkoni,	2009).
A	growing	body	of	 individual	difference	studies	have	begun	 to	use	an	 individual	difference	approach	 to	pinpoint	 the	neural	architecture	underlying	different	patterns	of	ongoing	 thought,	utilising	both	structural	and	 functional	descriptions	of	ongoing	 thought.
Karapanagiotidis	et	al.	(2017)	assessed	whether	individual	variability	in	the	content	of	their	thoughts	related	to	markers	of	structural	connectivity.	Structural	connectivity	using	DTI	identified	a	temporo-limbic	white	matter	region,	highly	connected	to	the	right	hippocampus,	in
people	who	spontaneously	engaged	 in	more	mental	 time	travel.	Functional	connectivity	analyses	revealed	a	 temporal	correlation	of	 the	right	hippocampus	with	 the	dorsal	anterior	cingulated	cortex,	a	core	region	of	 the	DMN,	which	was	modulated	by	 inter-individual
variation	in	mental	time	travel.	Therefore,	spontaneous	thoughts	experienced	during	mind	wandering,	especially	those	linked	to	mental	time	travel,	seems	to	be	underlined	by	the	hippocampus	and	its	integration	to	the	DMN.	This	assumption	has	been	highlighted	by
evidence	that	individuals	with	hippocampal	amnesia	are	less	likely	to	experience	off-task	episodes	with	rich	experiential	content	(McCormick	et	al.,	2018).
Other	studies	have	looked	at	the	relationship	between	the	functional	architecture	of	the	mind	and	population	variation	in	different	types	of	ongoing	thought.	Smallwood	et	al.	(2016)	explored	whether	individual	differences	in	the	functional	architecture	of	the	cortex
predicted	the	nature	of	spontaneous	thoughts.	Results	illustrated	that	the	functional	connectivity	of	the	temporal	poles	with	the	posterior	cingulated	cortex	was	predictive	of	both	greater	mental	time	travel	involving	social	agents	and	unpleasant	task-unrelated-thoughts.
Elsewhere,	the	role	of	the	temporal	pole	in	mental	time	travel	and	social	cognition	have	been	reported	(Pehrs	et	al.,	2015;	Pehrs	et	al.,	2018).	Smallwood	et	al.	(2016)	highlighted	that	connectivity	from	the	hippocampus	to	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex	predicted	greater
specificity	to	thoughts,	thus	giving	further	insight	into	the	key	role	that	the	hippocampus	may	play	when	connected	to	specific	nodes	of	the	DMN.	It	is	possible	that	the	role	of	the	hippocampus	is	particularly	important	in	the	future	planning	that	often	takes	place	during
spontaneous	thought.	Medea	et	al.	(2016)	demonstrated	that	our	capacity	to	develop	more	concrete	descriptions	of	both	goals	and	aspects	of	our	knowledge	is	supported	by	brain	networks	centred	on	the	hippocampus.	They	found	that	greater	coupling	between	the
hippocampus	and	more	dorsal	medial	frontal	regions,	including	the	pre-supplementary	motor	area,	was	a	specific	predictor	of	the	generation	of	more	concrete	goals.	Other	authors	have	explored	the	relationship	between	ongoing	thought	and	systems	that	are	important	in
tasks.	Work	by	Wang	and	colleagues	(2018)	for	example,	demonstrated	that	task	negative	aspects	of	ongoing	thought	may	be	linked	to	reduced	patterns	of	connectivity	with	systems	involved	in	external	attention.	In	addition,	Golchert	et	al.	(2017)	demonstrated	that
connectivity	between	the	executive	and	default	networks	was	greater	for	individuals	who	described	having	greater	control	over	the	off-task	experience.	A	comparable	pattern	was	observed	by	Mooneyham	et	al.	(2016)	who	found	that	individuals	reporting	higher	trait	levels
of	mind-wandering	in	daily	life	showed	more	connectivity	between	executive	and	default	systems,	a	pattern	that	may	reflect	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	mind-wandering	easy	tasksthe	fact	that	the	majority	of	mind-wandering	reported	during	easy	tasks	(such	as	rest)	 is
deliberate	(Seli	et	al.,	2016a).	The	combined	use	of	functional	and	structural	connectivity	highlights	further	the	heterogeneity	of	mind-wandering	experiences,	as	specific	characteristics	are	repetitively	associated	with	variations	in	neural	recruitments.
6	Future	directions
Neuroimaging	 approaches	 have	 been	 critical	 in	 helping	 improve	 neurocognitive	 accounts	 of	 different	 patterns	 of	 ongoing	 thought.	 In	 particular,	 the	 triangulation	 of	 both	measures	 of	 self-report	 with	 objective	 indices	 of	 information	 processing	 provided	 by
neuroimaging	in	quantifying	the	nature	of	internal	focus,	as	well	as	helping	address	the	reality	of	different	aspects	of	ongoing	thought.	In	the	future	it	seems	likely	that	these	measures	will	also	be	important	in	determining	the	dynamics	that	underpin	ongoing	experience,	as
well	as	refining	our	knowledge	of	the	causal	roles	that	different	systems	can	play.
One	important	area	of	research	is	understanding	the	nature	of	neural	dynamic	during	different	aspects	of	experience	(Kucyi,	2017).	EEG	phase	differences	are	used	to	measure	the	directional	flow	of	information	between	two	EEG	electrodes	sites.	Using	mean
phase	coherence,	Berkovich-Ohana	et	al.	(2014)	 found	 that	DMN	deactivation	during	a	 task,	compared	 to	a	 resting	baseline,	was	related	 to	 lower	gamma	and	 increased	alpha	mean	phase	coherence.	Lower	gamma	band	activity	could	 reflect	 the	decoupling	of	 the
control/executive	system	with	the	DMN,	whereas	the	increase	in	alpha	band	activity	could	reflect	 the	coupling	of	this	system	with	task-activated	network.	Additionally,	a	recent	study	investigated	the	neuronal	differences	between	thoughts	triggered	either	 internally	or
externally	using	a	correlation	coefficient	measure,	which	is	similar	to	coherence	measures	(Godwin	et	al.,	2016).	Findings	revealed	increased	functional	connectivity	over	parietal	areas	within	the	alpha	band	for	internal	compared	to	external	thoughts.	This	was	suggested
to	reflect	a	neural	mechanism	that	enables	the	suppression	of	externally	focused	attention	in	favour	of	internally	directed	processes.	It	is	possible	that	this	method	could	be	fruitfully	employed	in	the	examination	of	the	processing	of	perceptual	decoupling	that	it	is	thought	to
be	important	during	periods	of	internally	focused	attention	(Smallwood,	2013).
It	is	also	possible	to	understand	dynamical	properties	of	neural	signals	using	fMRI.	A	recent	study	demonstrated	that	states	of	mind-wandering	elicited	positive	functional	connectivity	between	regions	of	both	the	executive	and	default	networks	(Mooneyham	et	al.,
2016).	Here	the	use	of	dynamic	functional	connectivity	enabled	the	identification	of	different	states	of	functional	connectivity	across	known	networks.	This	measure	is	based	on	the	principle	that	functional	connectivity	relationships	between	brain	regions	and	networks	are
dynamically	 influenced	by	time,	and	reflects	changes	in	cognitive	states	(Calhoun	et	al.,	2014;	Hutchison	et	al.,	2013).	This	suggests	that	the	relationship	between	different	brain	areas	as	they	change	over	time	may	be	an	indicator	of	different	cognitive	states.	Thus,
dynamic	functional	connectivity	measures	may	play	an	important	role	in	future	studies	of	periods	of	ongoing	thought	(for	a	review	see	Kucyi	et	al.,	2017).
The	majority	 of	 studies	 have	 looked	 at	 the	 neural	 basis	 of	 ongoing	 thought	 using	EEG	and	 FfMRI	 and	while	 these	methods	 are	 important	 in	 describing	 the	 association	 between	 different	 states	 and	 patterns	 of	 neural	 activation,	 however,	 these	 data	 are
correlational.	In	the	future,	it	will	be	important	to	combine	these	methods	with	approaches	such	as	Transcranial	Magnetic	Stimulation	(tMS)	and	Transcranial	Direct	Current	Stimulation	(tDCS).	A	few	studies	(Axelrod	et	al.,	2015;	Axelrod	et	al.,	2018;	Boayue	et	al.,	2019;
Kajimura	et	al.,	2016;	Kajimura	and	Nomura,	2015)	have	explored	the	role	that	different	large	scale	systems	play	in	the	maintenance	and	initiation	of	different	patterns	of	thought.	A	related	technique	has	explored	the	effects	of	lesions	on	patterns	of	ongoing	thought.	For
example,	lesions	to	the	hippocampus	reduce	the	episodic	content	of	periods	of	mind-wandering	(McCormick	et	al.,	2018),	while	Bertossi	and	Ciaramelli	(2016)	demonstrated	that	lesions	to	the	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	reduce	future	thinking	during	the	off-task	state.
These	methods	are	important	because	they	allow	researchers	to	test	causal	accounts	of	the	role	of	neural	functions	in	periods	of	self-generated	thought.	Other	studies	have	looked	at	the	cognitive	consequences	of	stimulation	of	aspects	of	the	default	mode	network
(Foster	and	Parvizi,	2017),	and	it	would	be	useful	to	extend	these	types	of	methods	to	patterns	of	thought	measured	using	experience	sampling.	As	we	gain	a	more	conclusive	account	of	the	neural	systems	that	support	different	patterns	of	ongoing	thought,	methods	of
non-invasive	brain	stimulation	are	likely	to	be	increasingly	important	in	fine-tuning	mechanistic	accounts	of	how	covert	states	such	as	mind-wandering	unfold.
Finally,	it	may	be	possible	to	make	progress	on	understanding	the	processes	that	are	important	in	periods	of	self-generated	thought	by	testing	formal	models	of	how	these	processes	emerge.	The	component	process	account	(e.g.	Smallwood	and	Schooler,	2015)
argues	that	periods	of	off-task	thought	may	rely	on	the	combination	of	a	number	of	different	processes,	such	as	episodic	or	semantic	memory,	executive	control,	and	emotion.	This	approach	has	been	successfully	employed	in	studies	of	the	default	mode	network	(e.g.
Axelrod	et	al.,	2017)	and	in	studies	of	ongoing	experience	(Poerio	et	al.,	2017;	Turnbull	et	al.,	2019).	One	benefit	of	this	approach	is	that	the	introspective	evidence	can	be	combined	with	objective	tasks	data	(e.g.	measures	of	memory	retrieval).	In	addition,	well-specified
models	could	be	tested	formally	(Axelrod	and	Teodorescu,	2015;	Mittner	et	al.,	2014).
7	Conclusion
In	conclusion,	 the	use	of	neuroimaging	 tools	and	converging	methods	has	proven	to	be	 informative	 in	 the	study	of	mind	wandering.	The	use	of	ERP	and	EEG	methodologies	have	helped	demonstrate	 that	during	certain	 types	of	experience	 the	perceptual
processing	is	attenuated.	In	contrast,	fMRI	studies	have	provided	evidence	that	different	types	of	ongoing	thought	can	emerge	from	the	combination	of	different	large-scale	networks.	Patterns	of	ongoing	thought	are	a	critical	part	of	daily	life	with	implications	for	the	integrity
of	tasks	such	as	driving,	and	has	important	implications	for	mental	health.	Accordingly,	the	combination	of	self-reported	information	with	the	detailed	measures	of	neural	function	available	hold	the	promise	to	shed	critical	light	on	aspects	of	human	cognition.
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